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3Chapter One 
Same Sex Marriage and Constitutional Law 
 
On February 24, 2004, President George W. Bush called for a federal 
constitutional amendment that would define a marriage in the United States as one man 
and one woman, husband and wife. The President’s call was a response to several years 
of debate and legislation over marriage in the U.S. Seemingly endless legislation 
regarding same sex marriage has been fervently debated at the federal and state level for 
several years.1 During the Presidential election, state-by-state votes on the amendment 
were sponsored by the Republican Party. 
As a result of the proposed amendments, same sex marriage has taken its place 
among the top campaign issues, next to abortion and the death penalty, as a consideration 
for voters at the polls. If voters endorse same sex marriage, they will rarely support a 
candidate who opposes it.2 Opinions on same sex marriage are considered an ideological 
dividing line between “red” and “blue” states. Campaign-focused arguments about the 
future of same sex marriage have exploded since the last Presidential election.      
Questions arise about the constitutionality of the proposals as the arguments about 
same sex marriage increase and policy makers react to that discourse. Will an anti-same 
sex marriage amendment be added to the Federal Constitution? Could such an 
amendment hold in court? Many of the 2004 amendments to state constitutions were 
 
1 Charles E. Mauney Jr., “Landmark Decision or Limited Precedent: Does Lawrence v. Texas Require 
Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Same Sex Marriage?” Cumberland Law Review 35 (2005): 147.  
2 Katherine M. Franke, “Sexuality and Marriage: The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics,” Columbia 
Journal of Gender and the Law 15 (2006): 236.  
4responses to Hawaii’s and Massachusetts’ decisions to allow same sex marriages.3 While 
some states have made steps towards legalization, the results have been minimal. The 
Hawaii Legislature has recently reversed its court decision to allow same sex marriage 
and Massachusetts same sex marriage contracts have been declared null and void by the 
governor of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts cases will be heard in the Federal 
Supreme Court within the next two years and these cases will likely be the battle ground 
for a Federal decision on same sex marriage.4
How will this decision be made? As the amount of social, religious, political and 
strategic arguments surrounding same sex marriage grows, campaign-focused policy 
decisions increase. How will the Supreme Court separate the code of law from the 
politically motivated propaganda, if at all? Furthermore, what will the winning argument 
look like? While much of the discourse surrounding same sex marriage is social and 
religious in nature, I focus solely on the legal aspects of the debate. This thesis answers 
the question, “What might a sound legal argument for same sex marriage look like?” In 
order to answer this question effectively, this thesis focuses on several elements of the 
debate. In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of the aspects of constitutional law 
most relevant to my thesis. This chapter discusses the Equal Protection and Due Process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the meaning of liberty in relation to these 
clauses. My argument relies heavily on these concepts and applies them to existing 
precedent to construct a legal rationale for same sex marriage. The first of these 
constitutional themes is the Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection and Due 
Process clauses.  
 
3 The Hawaii State Supreme Court ruled in favor of same sex marriage in the case of Baehr v. Lewin in 
1996. The Massachusetts State Supreme Court followed in 2002.   
4 Goodridge, et. al. v. Department of Public Health, et. al.(2003).   
5Part One: The Fourteenth Amendment 
In order to understand a legal argument for same sex marriage, it is first necessary 
to determine what constitutional elements form the argument. The Fourteenth 
Amendment is an important part of the same sex marriage debate, as it is in my argument. 
Proposed by the thirty-ninth congress and ratified on June 13, 1868, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was intended to protect racial minorities, specifically African-Americans, 
from race-based discrimination.5 It states,  
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.6
The amendment is composed of several parts, called clauses. Two of these clauses are 
essential to my argument. They are the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process 
Clause.     
 
The Equal Protection Clause  
The Equal Protection Clause is made up of the section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment which reads, “…nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.” While the first uses of the Equal Protection Clause were 
primarily focused on racial discrimination, it has developed historically and is now 
considered the constitutional test for any form of discrimination, race-based or 
 
5 Lee Epstein and Thomas G. Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America (Washington: CQ Press, 
2000) 614. 
6 Constitution of the United States of America. USCS Const. Amend. 14, § 1 
6otherwise.7 Currently, US courts recognize three methods for applying the Equal 
Protection Clause in a case of suspected unlawful discrimination.8
The first of these methods is the “rational relation” standard for judicial review. 
This standard places a heavy burden of proof on the petitioner to demonstrate that the 
state’s policy in question exercises an irrational amount of discrimination. The state must 
merely demonstrate that the statute in question is rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest. This test is the easiest for the state to pass. However, the burden of 
proof gets heavier as the standard of review changes.  
 The second method for determining if a statute is discriminatory is the 
“heightened scrutiny” method of review. This intermediate level of scrutiny was 
articulated by the Court in United States v. Virginia when it identified that the state must 
have an exceedingly persuasive justification for the law and demonstrate that at least the 
challenged classification serves important governmental objectives. This standard has 
traditionally been applied to gender-based classification, but has been applied in cases 
which addressed anti-miscegenation laws like Loving v. Virginia.
Finally, the “strict scrutiny” standard of judicial review is applied to certain 
classes of discrimination which the court identifies as “suspect classes.” Traditionally, 
these are claims of discrimination based on race or national origin. This standard of 
review places a heavy burden of proof on the state. A law which receives this standard of 
review is considered unconstitutional unless the state can demonstrate that the 
 
7 Epstein and Walker, 617.  
8 Epstein and Walker, 614-621. This selection of text informs the following section regarding the levels of 
scrutiny used in the application of the Equal Protection Clause.  
 
7discrimination is substantially related and necessary for the accomplishment of a 
permissibly state objective, or a compelling state interest. 
The strict scrutiny standard determines whether a group is a suspect class using a 
three-tired test. The group in question must be a discrete and insular minority, with a 
history of discrimination. Next, advocates must demonstrate that the group is defined by 
an immutable characteristic, and finally, the group must have disproportionately limited 
access to political power. These tiers of the strict scrutiny standard are difficult to define 
and are therefore frequently debated. “Applying such criteria is difficult and has given 
rise to sharp divisions of opinion among the justices” of the Supreme Court.9
In addition to the three-tired test for suspect classification, strict scrutiny can be 
granted in cases involving the violation of a fundamental right. For example, any statute 
which prohibits freedom of speech would likely be granted strict scrutiny, regardless of 
the race of the petitioner, because freedom of speech is a fundamental right. Because this 
kind of scrutiny does not consider minority status, arguing that a violation of a 
fundamental right has taken place can be a strategic way to avoid demonstrating the three 
tiers of the test for suspect classification. I think it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
demonstrate that sexual orientation is a suspect classification using the three tiered test. 
Therefore, I argue that a fundamental right is violated when same sex couples are denied 
a marriage contract. My argument, presented in chapter four, relies heavily on the Due 
Process Clause but utilizes equal protection claims as well.      
 The Equal Protection Clause acts as a guideline for the Court and is open to many 
interpretations. How does a court determine if a group is based on an immutable 
characteristic, like skin color? What makes a state’s interest compelling, as opposed to 
 
9 Epstein and Walker, 616.  
8important? What makes a right fundamental?  These questions are highly contestable. A 
decision to apply one method of scrutiny over another is far from arbitrary, however. In 
fact, the standard of scrutiny applied will most likely determine the decision of the court 
in future same sex marriage cases. For this reason, the method of scrutiny applied to a 
case is a crucial determining factor of the decision. 
 
The Due Process Clause 
 The Equal Protection Clause is not the only constitutional consideration in the 
legal question of same sex marriage. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has a role in the discussion as well. The Due Process Clause reads, “…nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”10 While straightforward, the Due Process Clause raises many questions. Questions 
of definition abound. What is “liberty?” What counts as “property?” And, of course, what 
is “due process of law?”  
 Due process has been defined in both procedural and theoretical terms. In 
reference to procedure, due process means the “course of legal proceedings according to 
rules and principles established in our system of jurisprudence for protection and 
enforcement of private rights.”11 In other words, procedural due process is the process 
which is due to each citizen when he or she is confronted with the law. This includes the 
right to a fair trial, the reading of Miranda rights and other legal procedures.  
 My argument concerns the more abstract definition of due process, known as 
substantive due process. “‘Due process of law’ which the Fourteenth Amendment exacts 
 
10 Constitution of the United States of America. USCS Const. Amend. 14, § 1 
11 Scott v McNeal, 154 US 34, 38 L Ed 896, 14 S Ct. 1108, 1894. 
9from states is a conception of fundamental justice, and is not satisfied by mere formal 
correctness, nor is it confined by any absolute rule.”12 And so, there is more substance to 
due process than simply procedure.  
 Substantive due process deals directly with the fundamental rights which 
guarantee strict scrutiny protection. “Due process of law is summarized as a 
constitutional guaranty of respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of nation as to be ranked as fundamental or are implicit in 
concept of ordered liberty.”13 This means that the Due Process Clause protects 
fundamental rights. It follows that any violation of a fundamental right is a violation of 
the Due Process Clause. Because I argue the fundamental right to marry is violated when 
same sex couples cannot be married, I also argue that there is a violation of the Due 
Process Clause, or a substantive due process violation.  
Such a violation can come in many forms. The Due Process Clause “provides 
heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights 
and liberty interests.”14 It protects life, liberty and property; important fundamental rights. 
While life and property deserve fervent protection, my argument is most concerned with 
the concept of liberty. In order to fully understand the substantive due process violation 
in my argument, it is necessary to understand two forms of liberty, positive and negative.    
 
12 Foster v Illinois, 332 US 134, 91 L Ed 1955, 67 S Ct 1716, 1947. 
13 Rochin v California, 342 US 165, 96 L Ed 183, 72 S Ct 205, 25 ALR2d 1396, 1952.  
14 Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 138 L Ed 2d 772, 117 S Ct 2258, 97 CDOS 5008, 97, 1997. 
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Part Two: The Two Sides of Liberty 
 Liberty was a national value before our nation was a nation.15 It is, in the simplest 
of descriptions, fundamental. However concrete its role is in our nation’s democracy, the 
definition of “liberty” is highly flexible. It is a term which plays many roles in our 
government and code of law without having a clear definition. For the purpose of my 
argument, I require a two part definition of “liberty.” The idea that there are two kinds of 
liberty was functional in the Founding of the nation, although it was not outwardly 
acknowledged. Today, two terms are used to describe the two kinds of liberty. Those 
terms are “positive” and “negative” liberty. 
 The two-part definition of “liberty” describes the relationship between the 
individual and the government, be it state or federal. In essence, the terms “negative” and 
“positive” describe the role of the government in the life of the citizen and the actions of 
the citizen in relationship to the government. What results are two kinds of liberty; one 
includes privacy and the other includes recognition.    
 
Negative Liberty and the Right to Privacy 
Negative liberty is a conception of liberty which limits the role of government in 
its citizens’ lives. The liberties which compose this category were developed as early as 
the Founding. They are in the “freedom from” category, which includes the freedom from 
unreasonable search and seizure and cruel and unusual punishment. Also included among 
the negative liberties is the right refuse to harbor soldiers during wartime. While different 
 
15 Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist No. 1,” The Origins of the American Constitution, ed. Michael 
Kammen (New York: Penguin, 1986) 126. “…of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics 
the greatest number have begun their career, by paying an obsequious court to the people, commencing 
Demagogues and ending Tyrants.”  
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in magnitude and topic, these freedoms share a common theme: the government must 
stay out of certain fundamental aspects of the lives of its citizens. In other words, the 
relation between the government and its people is negative; there is no government 
involvement beyond legislating to limit the role of government.16 
While many of the cornerstone negative liberties were articulated at the dawn of 
this nation, others have developed as the nation’s history has progressed. The right to 
privacy is one such new liberty. “The assertion that the law should recognize a right to 
privacy originated in an 1890 law review essay by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis 
calling for ‘a general right to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and sensations.’”17 Privacy 
was introduced as a constitutional concept in contraception cases during the 1960’s. 
Among these are Eisenstadt v. Baird and Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965. While these 
cases concerned an idea of privacy different than the privacy torts that Warren and 
Brandeis defended, the concept of limited government intrusion is consistent within both 
ideas of privacy. Griswold will be discussed further in chapter three, though a discussion 
of the right to privacy is necessary here.  
 The right to privacy was directly associated with marriage and intimate 
relationships early in its development as a constitutional concept. In Eisenstadt, Justice 
William Brennan stated, “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwanted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
 
16 Michael Kammen, introduction, The Origins of the American Constitution, (New York: Penguin, 1986) 
ix. “[Political liberty]… meant freedom of action so long as it was not detrimental to others.” 
17 William N. Eskridge Jr. And Nan D. Hunter, Sexuality, Gender and the Law (New York: Foundation 
Press, 2004) 9.  
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child.”18 Clearly, the right to privacy is a negative liberty; a right which is respected when 
the government does not act, or intrude, in the lives of its citizens.  
 The right to privacy has expanded to include other “matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person,” like sexual conduct. In the case of Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the 
Court overturned a previous ruling, Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), and ruled against state 
regulation of same sex sexual behavior. Once again, the government was kept from 
intruding, quite literally, into the private bedrooms of it citizens. 
 One of the most useful examples of negative liberty is the right to choose to 
terminate a pregnancy. Since Roe v. Wade (1971), the government has been obligated to 
stay out of the private choices of women during the first six months of pregnancy. The 
right to choose is a negative liberty, and stems from the right to privacy articulated in 
cases like Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) and Griswold (1962).  
 Over time, the right to privacy has developed into a hodgepodge of rights, most 
associated with private relationships. Because privacy was not originally articulated as a 
fundamental liberty, its importance and mere existence is contested. Critics, like Robert 
Bork, have argued that the right to privacy is never outwardly articulated in the 
Constitution, nor is there any history of legislative intent to develop a right to privacy.19 
Regardless, the right to privacy is now firmly rooted in case precedent. “The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that one aspect of liberty afforded constitutional protection 
under the Due Process Clause is the right of privacy.”20 It has taken its place among our 
 
18 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 31 L. Ed.2d 349. 1972.  
19 Robert Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some first Amendment Problems,” Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971): 
8-9.  
20 JoLynn M. Schlichting. “Minnesota’s Proposed Same Sex Marriage: A Flamingly Unconstitutional 
Violation of Full Faith and Credit, Due Process and Equal Protection.” William Mitchell Law Review 31 
(2005): 1649. 
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negative liberties. Among the category of negative liberties, privacy is most essential to 
my argument for same sex marriage.  
 Negative liberty is only half of the two-part definition of “liberty”. The concept of 
positive liberty is also necessary for a rigorous argument in favor of same sex marriage. 
Positive liberty is the opposite of negative liberty; as opposed to protecting privacy, 
positive liberties are guaranteed government actions.  
 
Positive Liberty and Recognition 
Since the Founding of the United States, United States citizens have been entitled 
to certain things. This concept of “freedom to” liberties is at the core of civil rights and is 
what separates democracy from fascism. Foundational positive liberties are those actions 
in which citizens are free to engage without government punishment.  
Positive liberty is not reserved solely for the citizen, however. The government, 
too, must act. Both government and citizen are inactive when negative liberties are 
concerned (the citizen does not have to do certain things for the government and the 
government is prohibited from requesting certain things of its citizens). Contrarily, 
positive liberty imposes obligation on the government. These obligations of the state to 
its citizens can be financial, as is the case with Social Security and tax refunds. Other 
positive obligations include access to polling places to facilitate the right to vote. Most 
pertinent to my argument, however, is the obligation of the state to recognize some 
intimate relationships as marital. The case of Loving v. Virginia (1967) was the first 
significant Supreme Court case involving recognition of a marriage. This case, and its 
relationship to my argument, will be discussed in following chapters.  
14
A legal argument for same sex marriage can come in many forms. Indeed, when 
one has an objective in mind, the Constitution can appear as a tool for achieving that 
objective. Many have chosen the tools of civil rights, others one of equal protection, 
while still others view same sex marriage as an issue of federalism and the rights of 
individual states.  
While there are many ways to construct the case for same sex marriage, some are 
more straightforward than others. I aim to piece the constitutional issues together to form 
a fairly simple and cohesive line of reasoning that legitimizes same sex marriage. This 
thesis applies the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, with a foundation of case 
precedent, to the question of same sex marriage and concludes that same sex marriage 
should be legal in the United States. The foundational constitutional themes have been 
review in this chapter. In the next chapter, I examine the literature which currently shapes 
the same sex marriage debate and demonstrate the necessity for an un-biased and 
comprehensive legal argument. I describe the case law which contributes to my argument 
in chapter three of this thesis. Finally, in chapter four, I demonstrate that the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution requires equal distribution of the liberties associated with 
the fundamental right to marry. My argument is based on case precedent and current legal 
scholarship and is formulated as a comprehensive Fourteenth Amendment argument for 
same sex marriage. This thesis places itself in a body of scholarship which is composed 
of contradictory and incomplete perspectives. These perspectives are discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
The amount of scholarly or popular literature produced to address same sex 
marriage has increased dramatically over the past several years. This is due for the most 
part to the case of Lawrence v. Texas in the legal field and Republican attempts to amend 
the Constitution in the political field.  
Because the question of same sex marriage indirectly relates to almost every other 
issue of law and politics, the literature which discusses same sex marriage touches on 
many debates. Aspects of the same sex marriage debate lead to questions about religion, 
federalism, interstate commerce and adoption law, among others. The literature that 
discusses civil rights, equal protection, liberty and due process most concerns my thesis. 
This literature is equally varied. While there are predictable arguments from the radical 
Christian right which argue that same sex marriage violates traditional family values,21 
and far-left arguments which support same sex marriage from the standpoint of civil 
rights,22 there are other, less politically-split qualities of the discussion. This chapter 
reviews the scholarly and popular literature surrounding the same sex marriage debate 
and demonstrates that an un-biased and comprehensive legal argument is necessary. My 
argument is unique for this reason. This thesis is significant because it brings together 
many aspects of constitutional law, presenting a more complete, legal argument. Virtually 
none of the literature herein reviewed attempts this. The body of literature into which my 
argument fits is vast, and includes many debates on its fringes.  
 
21 The Gay Agenda: Gay Marriage, film, The Report Multi-Media Resource Center, 1993.  
22 Brenda Feigen, “Same Sex Marriage: An Issue of Constitutional Rights, Not Moral Opinions,” Harvard 
Women’s Law Journal 27 (2004): 345. 
16
 The perspectives of queer theorists are among the less conventional arguments 
surrounding same sex marriage. Many of these scholars, including Paula Ettelbrick, are 
against same sex marriage. The fringe of the debate also includes the arguments of 
conservative academics like Andrew Sullivan, who supports gay marriage for its 
promotion of a conservative social institution. These arguments in the same sex marriage 
discussion run against the grain of the conventional socio-political sides of the debate. 
Still, one theme unites the many sides of the same sex marriage discussion in terms of 
civil rights and discrimination. That is the Fourteenth Amendment.   
 The Fourteenth Amendment plays a direct or indirect role in the civil rights and 
discrimination discussion of same sex marriage. Regardless of the overall thesis of the 
argument (for or against same sex marriage), an approach to the Equal Protection Clause 
or the Due Process Clause is developed, with or without intention. In many cases, both 
clauses are addressed.   
Indeed, almost every argument that attempts to approach the law and its 
relationship to same sex marriage inevitably argues for either rational basis, heightened 
or strict scrutiny legal analysis. For example, it would be contradictory and counter-
productive to support the suspect classification of homosexuals (thereby granting them 
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause) while simultaneously arguing against 
same sex marriage. The method of scrutiny supported by the author, therefore, can be 
inferred by the argument made.  
 For this reason, the standards of scrutiny applied by the Court in Fourteenth 
Amendment cases are an effective way to organize the literature surrounding the same 
sex marriage debate. The first group of arguments reviewed herein utilizes the rational 
17
relation test, which places a heavy burden of proof on those in favor of same sex 
marriage and does not support homosexuals as a protected class. While this standard of 
review appears to support an argument against same sex marriage, paradoxically, some 
perspectives argue otherwise. In the first section of this review, I demonstrate how these 
arguments (those for and against same sex marriage) conflict and do not lead to the 
clarification of the question of scrutiny. It follows that they do not develop clear, legally 
applicable arguments.  
Those arguments that support heightened scrutiny are equally confusing. In the 
second section of this review, I discuss those arguments which lend support to the 
heightened scrutiny standard of review. This standard has traditionally been applied to 
gender-based classification. The arguments which support this standard come from all 
sides of the political spectrum. Among them are the perspectives of radical feminists and 
queer theorists. While some of these arguments support gay marriage, others argue 
against it. Much of the inconsistency within these arguments stems from disagreement 
within the gay and lesbian community over how the gay rights movement should 
approach same sex marriage and the assimilation it implies. While valid and interesting, 
this lack of continuity within the community further confuses the practical application of 
gay rights arguments to a legal analysis of the same sex marriage issue. The 
inconsistency within the gay community infringes upon a consistent argument for 
heightened scrutiny because the argument relies on the nature of same sex relationships 
and, in order to be effective, must be applicable to all.  
Similarly, disagreement over the nature of gay and lesbian identity impedes a 
unified argument for strict scrutiny. In the third section of this review, I will examine the 
18
arguments which support strict scrutiny, the standard of review which protects minorities 
under a “suspect classification.” Suspect classification is a category that has traditionally 
been reserved for those discriminated against based on race. This categorization raises 
many questions regarding the nature of homosexuality itself. While some argue that 
identifying one’s self as gay man or a lesbian is an expression of an immutable 
characteristic, an expression of identity23 others believe that gay and lesbian identity is 
defined by the act of gay or lesbian conduct, or sex. “The conduct-centered view holds 
that what a person does determines what she is; the status-centered view argues that her 
sexuality is so central to her identity that what she is exists independently of what she 
does.”24 Among those in the “identity camp,” the endorsement of same sex marriage is 
split. On the other side, those that support an act-based classification are, for the most 
part (sometimes unintentionally), against the classification of gay men and lesbians as a 
suspect class. This does not mean, however, that these arguments do not support same 
sex marriage. The possible existence of a gay gene and the implications of such a 
discovery for both sides of the acts/identity debate pose the possibility that while identity 
appears to be the clear path to suspect classification, it may not necessarily lead to same 
sex marriage.25 
Indeed, organizing the same sex marriage debate using the Equal Protection 
Clause demonstrates a lack of consistency within the debate. This organization 
demonstrates that there are many “sides” to this argument. It is necessary for a practical, 
 
23 Allyson Albert, “Irreconcilable Differences? A Constitutional Analysis as to Why the United States 
Should Follow Canada’s Lead and Allow Same Sex Marriage,” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 30 
(2005): 547.  
24 Nan D. Hunter, “Life After Hardwick,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 27 (1992): 531 
25 Robert Alan Brookey, Reinventing the Male Homosexual: The Rhetoric and Power of the Gay Gene
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002). 118-148. 
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legal analysis of the issue, however, to analyze how the foundational themes of these 
arguments relate to the law, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment. Such an analysis 
demonstrates the lack of any solely legal argument for or against same sex marriage. The 
following sections present the body of literature surrounding the same sex marriage 
debate. The sections are organized by method of scrutiny. The first of these is the rational 
relation standard.   
Part One: Arguments for Rational Relation Standard 
The rational relation standard of judicial review challenges gay men or lesbians to 
demonstrate that the questionable discrimination against them is not rationally related to 
the goals of the state. In most cases discussed herein, those goals are to limit the rights of 
same sex couples, which I do not consider a legitimate state interest. This standard of 
scrutiny places the burden of proof on the petitioner to make such a demonstration. 
Oddly, the prevailing precedent which supports the rational relation test for sexual 
orientation is a case in which the petitioners won, despite their burden of proof. That case 
is Romer v. Evans, decided in 1993.
Romer considered a Colorado state constitutional amendment which barred the 
classification of homosexuals as a group to be protected from discrimination. The Court 
ruled against Colorado. The holding described a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
based on the rational basis test for judicial review. This case contributes a great deal to 
the question of classifying of homosexuals as a protected group. In applying the rational 
relation test for judicial review, the Court determined that “a bare desire to harm a 
20
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.26 The 
Court ruled against the statute on the ground that it was self defeating; in preventing the 
classification of homosexuals, the state of Colorado classified them as a group not 
available for classification. While the decision is limited in its scope, the majority opinion 
demonstrates that the Court is becoming more sensitive to gay and lesbian rights and that 
those rights can be protected under a rational relations test.  
Romer demonstrates that the application of the Equal Protection Clause through 
the rational relation test can result in a decision in favor of gay and lesbian rights. Such a 
precedent lends a great deal to those who support same sex marriage but do not consider 
the question of same sex marriage from a civil rights perspective. One such argument is 
made by Andrew Sullivan.27 Sullivan describes a conservative argument in support of 
same sex marriage. His reasoning is based primarily of the value of the emotional and 
financial stability of the marriage commitment. Sullivan argues that, just as it is for 
heterosexuals, marriage promotes conservative values in the gay and lesbian community. 
Because these values are, according to Sullivan, beneficial to society, as many 
individuals as possible should be allowed to marry. Sullivan argues that the state should 
treat same sex and heterosexual couples as equal. This claim is most supportive of a 
rational relation standard of review, the standard which does not make a clear distinction 
between the majority and minority.  
Sullivan may not understand, however, that his argument agrees with that of 
politically conservative homophobic activists. Sullivan’s argument does not present a 
clear legal path to same sex marriage. If any legal analysis can be derived, it is an 
 
26 Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620, 116 S. Ct. 1996.  
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endorsement of a standard that places a heavy burden of proof on same sex couples. 
While Sullivan’s conservative values may promote his perspective well in the political 
arena, they hinder any legal argument he makes. By inadvertently endorsing the rational 
relation standard, Sullivan (a gay man) includes himself among other conservatives who 
do not endorse same sex marriage. This group includes Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the 
Supreme Court’s most conservative Justices.  
In his dissent in Romer, Justice Scalia describes his support for Amendment 2, the 
Colorado Amendment to classify homosexuals as a group not entitled to constitutional 
protection. Scalia refuses to designate homosexuals as a class because the group itself 
does not pass the test for suspect classification. Scalia argues that homosexuality is not an 
immutable characteristic but a lifestyle choice and that the gay rights movement 
demonstrates that gays have ample (if not disproportionate) access to political power. 
Failure on two of the three tiers of the test for suspect classification does not warrant the 
protection of homosexuals as a class, according to Scalia.  
Because he does not entitle gay men and lesbians constitutional protection as a 
suspect class, Scalia’s argument supports the application of the rational relation test to 
questions involving discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Indeed, Scalia 
argues that Colorado had a legitimate interest in “denying special protections to 
homosexual conduct or to persons with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in 
such conduct.”28 Both Scalia and Sullivan, therefore, argue that sexual orientation is not a 
characteristic which defines a person as a member of a group deserving protection in the 
eyes of the law. Sullivan argues for assimilation and acceptance, however, while Scalia 
advocates ignorance and limited representation. With a more in-depth understanding of 
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how these two arguments relate to the future application of the Equal Protection Clause, 
both types of rational relation supporters could (indeed, should) transform their limited 
perspectives into arguments which can challenge not only the opposition but one another.  
 
Part Two: Arguments for Heightened Scrutiny  
The arguments which support the heightened scrutiny standard of review are 
equally limited in scope and are difficult to apply to a future same sex marriage decision. 
The debate over heightened scrutiny in sexual orientation discrimination cases does not 
result in a clear course of action on the issue of same sex marriage. Paula Ettelbrick’s 
article, “Since when is Marriage a Path to Liberation?” illustrates this point well29.
Ettelbrick claims that “marriage runs contrary to two of the primary goals of the lesbian 
and gay movement: the affirmation of gay identity and culture and the validation of many 
forms of relationships.” Her argument has two parts; first, that the insistence that gays 
and lesbians be treated as identical to married couples runs contrary to the drives of the 
queer movement- to resist the idea that the norm is heterosexuality. Second, Ettelbrick 
argues that to embrace same sex marriage is, in a sense, to abandon the ideals of equal 
rights for women. Her argument relies in part on the assumptions that heterosexual 
marriage is an institution which discriminates against women and that the queer 
movement, in resisting heterosexual marriage, supports those women who are in 
oppressive heterosexual relationships. Ettelbrick places the responsibility of protecting all 
marginal groups (women, people of color and the poor) with the queer movement and 
gay rights activists. 
 
29 Paula Ettelbrick, “Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?,” OUT/LOOK Autumn 1989: 8-12.   
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Ettelbrick does not support same sex marriage. However, she does indirectly 
support a standard of scrutiny which could make same sex marriage more likely than, 
say, the rational relation standard.30 Ettelbrick makes a connection between homosexuals 
and women. Because the heightened scrutiny standard is concerned with gender 
discrimination, this connection could grant homosexuals heightened scrutiny by arguing 
that the primary goal of the queer movement is to represent marginalized groups 
(especially women) and that queer opposition to marriage speaks directly on behalf of 
women in oppressive marriages. That standard would strengthen the burden of proof 
placed on the state, making the possibility of same sex marriage nearer to a reality. 
Considering these implications, it is difficult to place the radical feminist and queer 
argument into a practical legal context, despite the importance of these perspectives.  
Diane Miller attempts to contextualize Ettelbricks perspective in her book The 
Freedom to Differ: the Shaping of the Gay and Lesbian Struggle for Civil Rights. Miller 
disagrees with Ettelbrick and, consequently and inadvertently, weakens the heightened 
scrutiny argument. While Miller recognizes that the gay rights movement and radical 
feminism do intersect in some respects, she claims that “on other occasions, the two 
groups have worked with a complete disregard for each other or even at cross-
purposes.”31 The claim that the gay rights movement directly relates to women’s rights is 
therefore one that, at best, can only be applied at certain times and to certain individuals. 
Such a specific relationship is unlikely to sufficiently warrant a heightened scrutiny 
claim.   
 
30 JoLynn M. Schlichting, “Minnesota’s Proposed Same-Sex Marriage Amendment: A Flamingly 
Unconstitutional Violation of Full Faith and Credit, Due Process and Equal Protection,” William Mitchell 
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Disagreement over the importance of resistance to assimilation exists within the 
gay rights movement. According to Miller, there is a “spectrum of possibilities, bounded 
on one end by absolute separatism and on the other end by the goal of complete 
assimilation.”32 Ettelbrick falls on the separatist end of that spectrum. Because of the lack 
of continuity across the gay rights movement, only a portion of the group supports 
Ettelbrick’s claim and, consequently, heightened scrutiny. While these inconsistencies are 
acceptable when applied to the debate in any other context, a strong legal argument 
requires universal application. 
David J. Mayo and Martin Gunderson address the shortcomings of Ettelbrick’s 
argument in their article, “The Right to Marriage, a Critique of the Leftist Critique,” 
published in the Journal of Social Philosophy. Mayo and Gunderson describe effectively 
the radical feminist critique and liberal gay rights critique of same sex marriage. The 
article dismisses these perspectives for several reasons. First, Mayo and Gunderson assert 
that same sex marriage may break down gender stereotypes, not strengthen them. Citing 
Nan Hunter’s “Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry,” Mayo and Gunderson 
cite the unlikely possibility that same sex marriages would oppress women specifically, 
in fact, it would likely be quite the contrary. Next, ironically, the article addresses the 
queer perspective and dismisses it under a justification of Equal Protection. Mayo and 
Gunderson claim that civil rights should always trump policy considerations.  Ettelbrick’s 
argument supports the withholding of civil rights from a marginalized group to the 
benefit of others. While Ettelbrick admits that “when analyzed from the standpoint of 
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civil rights, certainly lesbians and gay men should have the right to marry,”33 she places 
the policy considerations of the queer movement above these civil rights.  
The differing perspectives regarding the relationship between the gay rights 
movement in the women’s movement must be compromised in order to develop a clear 
argument for heightened scrutiny. While Ettelbrick, Miller, Mayo and Gunderson do not 
agree on the implications of such a relationship, they acknowledge that the relationship 
does exist. That relationship could be crucial for a practical legal application of the 
heightened scrutiny test. 
 
Part Three: Suspect Classification, Identity Formation and Strict Scrutiny 
Unlike heightened scrutiny, strict scrutiny places the burden of proof on the 
shoulders of the state. This standard of review, traditionally applied to race-related cases 
of discrimination, promises a clear path towards same sex marriage, according to some of 
its proponents. However, prior to 1993, this standard had never been applied to a case of 
sexual orientation discrimination.  
Baehr v. Lewin (1993) marked a change in states application of the Equal 
Protection Clause to same sex marriage. For the first time, a state supreme court plurality 
in Hawaii determined that strict scrutiny should be applied to the states denial of marriage 
to same sex couples. The court did not, however, directly apply the standard. Instead, it 
remanded the case back to a lower court for further determination of the “compelling 
interest” (if any) of the state. The lower court could not find a compelling interest of the 
state and the case was referred back to the state supreme court. There, the decision was 
finalized. Later, the Hawaii legislature passed laws which trumped the court ruling. Still, 
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Baehr remains among the few cases addressing same sex marriage in light of the Equal 
Protection Clause and the strict scrutiny standard.    
Allyson Albert endorses the strict scrutiny standard in her article, “Irreconcilable 
Differences? A Constitutional Analysis as to Why the United States Should Follow 
Canada's Lead and Allow Same-Sex Marriage.” Albert seeks to establish that the US 
Supreme Court should raise the level of judicial review afforded to homosexuals in 
analysis of the Equal Protection Clause. Albert draws a comparison between the 
decisions of the Canadian Court to allow same sex marriage in Halpern v. Toronto.34 The 
Court made the argument that keeping homosexuals from the institution of marriage 
constituted a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Albert argues 
that the Canadian Court’s constitutional analysis in Halpern can and should inform the 
decision of the US Court to consider homosexuals as a class to be protected. Part Three 
of the article provides a background of the Equal Protection Clause and the methods of 
judicial review used to apply it. This section also provides a relevant discussion of Romer 
and Lawrence.  In Part Four, Albert supports of the use of strict scrutiny for cases 
involving discrimination based on sexual orientation and the classification of 
homosexuals as a suspect class, like race. Albert addresses the history of discrimination, 
immutability and political powerlessness requirements for suspect classification.  
In determining the immutability of homosexuality, Albert outlines an important 
debate which informs the immutability distinction. It is the debate between acts and 
identity conceptions of homosexuality.  
The immutability of homosexuality depends upon the definition of 
“homosexuality”, Albert asserts. Homosexuality is not immutable if it is defined in the 
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manner which Justice Antonin Scalia defines it; a manner which is based primarily on the 
act of homosexual sex, something which is entirely voluntary. In contrast, Albert 
describes how the Canadian Court recognizes the influence of genetics on homosexuality; 
making it a non-voluntary, immutable characteristic. Similarly, Brenda Feigen argues in 
support of same sex marriage and homosexual immutability. She bases her argument 
primarily on her condemnation of the acts-based perspective, which determines 
homosexual identity by one’s actions first and foremost. Whether or not homosexuality is 
seen as immutable by the Court greatly affects the level of scrutiny applied.   
While Albert and Feigen argue in support of immutability as the path to legalized 
same sex marriage, Robert Alan Brookey believes otherwise. In Reinventing the Male 
Homosexual, the Rhetoric and Power of the Gay Gene, Brookey describes the legal and 
political implications of the “gay gene.” Most scholars, like Albert and Feigen, assert that 
the gay gene would provide uncontestable evidence for the immutability of homosexual 
identity, strengthening the case for strict scrutiny. Indeed, if sexual orientation were 
immutable, like race, it would be protected as a suspect class. However, Brookey 
describes how the existence of a gay gene (and other evidence of immutability) could 
provide more of a weapon for opponents of same sex marriage than has been predicted by 
such speculators as Albert and Feigen.35 
Brookey draws an analogy to the classification of homosexuality as a mental 
disorder to illustrate his point. When homosexuality was so classified, gay rights activists 
were outraged. Their response to the classification was that their lifestyle was not an 
illness, but a rational choice. Brookey, in a sense, connects the Scalia “lifestyle choice” 
argument to gay activists. How, then, will the activist argument proceed if the gay gene is 
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discovered? Brookey describes how, just as the classification of homosexuality as a 
mental disorder did, the discovery of a gay gene will likely strengthen attempts to “cure” 
or “treat” homosexuality- thereby weakening the gay rights movement. At the same time, 
however, the gay gene will undoubtedly strengthen the immutability aspect of suspect 
classification.  
The gay gene is problematic in the same sex marriage debate because it provides 
simultaneous support for both sides. Brookey describes the unpredictability of a court 
decision when the gay gene is involved. Indeed, the classification of homosexuals as a 
suspect class may not, in fact, support the conclusion that same sex marriage follows. 
Brookey makes clear that, despite the apparent simplicity of the necessary arguments, the 
gay gene does not provide the clear and resounding support for suspect classification 
many have argued. Thus, The Equal Protection Clause does not in fact provide a clear 
solution to the problem.  
The intricacies of the Equal Protection Clause do not provide a clear solution to 
the legal argument but allow for a workable structure within which the debate can be 
framed. In presenting the sides of this argument through their implications on a future 
legal decision, one can see where these perspectives lack practical legal application or 
consistency. While some argue for the legalization of same sex marriage, they 
inadvertently support the rational relation standard. On the other hand, by associating the 
gay rights movement with women’s rights, some anti-same sex marriage perspectives are 
contradictory. Finally, despite the promise of the gay gene to the pro-same sex marriage 
side of the immutability debate, this “golden ticket” to suspect classification may be more 
trouble than it’s worth.  
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 My research seeks to prevent these problems of legal application by, frankly, 
avoiding them altogether. My argument is based initially on substantive due process and 
touches on equal protection only after the violation of a fundamental right is established. 
Effectively, my argument nullifies the acts and identity debate by maintaining a universal 
approach to identity and conduct through a discussion of liberty, both positive and 
negative. 
 My argument separates legal analysis from moral issues like the acts and identity 
debate. Still, there is one relationship between ethics and legal analysis necessary to my 
argument. Ethics and law converge at the concept of fundamental rights. The Court uses 
two standards by which to judge a fundamental right. In order for a liberty interest to be 
considered fundamental, it must be either “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and 
tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”36 The legal issues involved in 
the same sex marriage question, therefore, turn on what constitutes a fundamental right, 
as does my argument. While my argument is focused primarily on questions that arise 
after the establishment of a fundamental right, the definition of such rights is a moral as 
well as historical issue. For this reason, the arguments discussed in this chapter actively 
contribute to a legal analysis of the same sex marriage question.     
With the moral and historical foundation of the legal concepts established, I move 
to a strictly legal analysis of the issue. As I have demonstrated in this chapter, combining 
ethical and legal argument produces inconsistent and ineffective legal analysis. My 
argument presents a less problematic line of reasoning towards the legalization of same 
sex marriage. This line of reasoning is based on existing case precedent which develops 
the argument for same sex marriage. These cases are described in the next chapter.  
 
36 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721, 1997.  
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Chapter Three 
Relevant Case Law 
 
Case law acts as a foundation for every legal argument. In order to construct a 
solid argument for same sex marriage, I present a review of the case law relevant to my 
argument. Those cases most relevant to my argument are those that address issues of 
equal protection and due process, both found in the Fourteenth Amendment. I will apply 
these cases to my argument in support of gay marriage in the next chapter. 
The following cases contribute to my argument in several ways. First, Meyer, 
Pierce and Skinner establish the fundamental right to marry, and clarify that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects this right. Second, Griswold establishes an element of 
negative liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Third, the cases of Loving, Zablocki and Turner establish an element of positive liberty in 
the fundamental right to marry. Finally, Lawrence v. Texas demonstrates that many of 
these cases apply to same sex relationships.  
This chapter reviews the facts, issues and holdings of eight Supreme Court 
decisions between 1923 and 2003. I have chosen these cases because they represent the 
broader body of case law surrounding the question of same sex marriage. The cases are 
organized chronologically. As time has progressed, the Court’s attitude towards the 
Fourteenth Amendment has evolved. The Court has developed increasingly specific 
methods and rationales for approaching the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process 
Clause.   
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In the early years of the twentieth century, the focus of Fourteenth Amendment 
decisions was mainly on the Equal Protection Clause in cases like Meyer v. Nebraska, 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Skinner v. Oklahoma. In 1965, Supreme Court rulings 
involving the right to marry changed. With Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court’s focus 
moved from equal protection to due process, mainly the right to privacy. The cases which 
followed Griswold also emphasized due process and privacy but moved further towards a 
more positive role of the state in recognizing certain marriages. With the cases of Loving 
v. Virginia, Zablocki v. Redhail and Turner v. Safley, the Court has developed a line of 
precedent which indicates that there is not only a right to marry and to keep one’s married 
life private, but a right to marry whom one chooses, and to have that marriage recognized 
by the state.  
 
Part One: Early Equal Protection Cases: Establishing the Fundamental Right to 
Marry 
Demonstrating the existence of the fundamental right to marry provides the first 
step towards an effective Fourteenth Amendment argument for same sex marriage. The 
following cases were decided early in the history of Supreme Court cases addressing 
marriage. They articulate that the right to marry is indeed fundamental to the freedom and 
liberty of U.S. citizens.   
 
Meyer v. State of Nebraska (1923) 
 Meyer v. Nebraska articulated the fundamental right to marry first. In 1908, 
Meyer was a bilingual school teacher interested in sharing his knowledge of the German 
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language with his students. By teaching one of his students, a ten year old boy, how to 
speak German Meyer violated a Nebraska state law which forbade the teaching of any 
language other than English to a child who had not passed the eighth grade. Meyer 
challenged the law on the grounds that it was an invasion of liberty guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
 The case was argued before the Supreme Court in 1923. In his opinion for the 
majority, Justice James McReynolds articulated the constitutional question before the 
Court, “…whether the statute as constructed and applied unreasonably infringes the 
liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment.”37 The Court 
decided that the statue was unreasonable and ruled in favor of Meyer. In their decision, 
the majority asserted several important claims about the Fourteenth Amendment which 
are relevant to the gay marriage question.  
McReynolds argued that several of the liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment have been definitely stated by the Court. He wrote, “…without a doubt, [the 
Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the 
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to 
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children…”38 This 
statement possibly establishes the right to marry as one of the liberties guaranteed by the 
Federal Constitution. While it can be argued that McReynolds’ comments are mere dicta, 
the substantial precedent supporting the fundamental right to marry indicates that 
McReynolds comments play a larger role in the body of case law.  
 
37 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923).  
38 Meyer, 399. 
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Furthermore, McReynolds asserts that “this liberty may not be interfered with 
under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or 
without reasonable relation to some purpose.”39 This opinion demonstrates that the 
Constitution and the Court protect the right to marry. It is unclear, however, whether the 
“right to marry” indicates a right to marry whoever one wishes, including members of the 
same sex. Indeed, the “common occupations of life” to which McReynolds refers 
certainly did not include same sex marriage, especially not in 1923. Meyer raises more 
questions than it provides answers. It is a step towards developing a more specific 
description of the rights protected by of the Fourteenth Amendment.   
 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters; Pierce v. Hill Military Academy (1925) 
In the Meyer opinion, McReynolds establishes the foundation of a series of cases 
which elaborate on his list of liberties. One such case is Pierce v. Society of Sisters. In 
1922, Oregon passed the Compulsory Education Act which required every student in 
Oregon to attend public school, with few exceptions. After a rapid decline in enrollment, 
loss of revenue and several broken contracts with teachers and parents, the Society of 
Sisters and Hill Military Academy filed a petition to stop the act before the loss of 
business caused their private schools to close.  
The decision of the Court, written by Justice McReynolds, reiterated the Meyer 
decision. The case related to parents’ ability to choose the education of their children, a 
protected liberty, which Meyer established. In addition, the Society of Sisters decision 
articulated some interesting points about the Equal Protection Clause. First, McReynolds 
established that “a law which increases the uniformity of the application of the law 
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cannot by any stretch of the imagination be classed as a law which denies the equal 
protection of the law.”40 This means that perfection need not be achieved in order for a 
law to be constitutional. If it merely attempts to expand equal access to liberty, a statute 
cannot violate the Equal Protection Clause.  
The flexibility of the law becomes clearly applicable to the question of same sex 
marriage when McReynolds elaborates, “The right to the equal protection of the laws is 
not denied when it is apparent that the same law or course of procedure is applicable to 
every other person in the State under similar circumstances and conditions.”41 In other 
words, the Equal Protection Clause does not require that each and every person be 
granted access to the same rights and liberties. Only people “under similar circumstances 
and conditions” were required to share the same rights. The specification of “similar 
circumstances and conditions” could easily be interpreted to protect all other people in 
the State who have the same sexual orientation as the petitioner in question. Society of 
Sisters provides an ambiguous impact on the gay marriage question. On one hand, the 
Society of Sisters decision reinforced the Meyer language while, on the other hand, it 
articulated an exceptional condition in which an equal protection claim can not be made.  
 
Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 
 The Court began to clarify much of the ambiguity surrounding equal protections 
claims with Skinner. Skinner challenged an Oklahoma criminal sterilization act. The 
Oklahoma law required mandatory sterilization of those repeatedly convicted of a “felony 
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involving moral turpitude.”42 Such felonies, as defined by the act, included theft but 
excluded embezzlement. Skinner, charged with his third felony theft, claimed that the 
Oklahoma law was an undue exercise of police power and violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court ruled unanimously in his favor, 
the opinion written by Justice William Douglas, articulated a different opinion. Douglas 
argued that the Equal Protection Clause had been violated.  
 Douglas explained that the crimes of theft and embezzlement are of the same 
nature and “they are punishable in the same manner,” both as felonies.43 One violates the 
Equal Protection Clause when sterilization is imposed inequitably. The Court “does not 
prevent the legislature from recognizing ‘degrees of evil,’” nor does it constrain the 
legislature “in the exercise of its police power to ignore experience which marks a class 
of offenders or a family of offenses for special treatment.”44 Douglas made clear that the 
Equal Protection Clause gives the legislature the power and right to impose limitations 
upon some groups and not others. However, he articulates an important exception which 
is crucial to the question of same sex marriage.  
 The Douglas opinion classifies the right to marry as fundamental. Douglas says, 
“…the instant legislation runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, though we give 
Oklahoma that large deference which the rule of the forgoing cases requires. We are 
dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. 
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race.”45 Douglas explains that, when such an important right is violated, the Equal 
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Protection Clause has as much relevance “as if [the law] had selected a particular race or 
nationality for oppressive treatment.”46 Despite its deference to the legislature, the Court 
is obligated to protect the “basic civil rights of man.” Douglas includes marriage among 
these fundamental rights.  
 In his Skinner opinion, Douglas establishes a loophole of sorts for those seeking 
equal protection of the law. Where once the clause was reserved solely for claims of 
racial or ethnic discrimination, it became available for those citizens whose fundamental 
rights had been violated. Skinner established an alternative route to equal protection. If 
one cannot make a case for suspect classification, there is still opportunity for 
constitutional protection if the petitioner can demonstrate that a fundamental right has 
been violated. In order to argue for same sex marriage, then, it is necessary to argue that 
the fundamental right to marry has been withheld from gay men and lesbians.    
 
Part Two: Due Process Cases: A Shift from Privacy to Recognition, Negative to 
Positive Liberty 
 Fourteenth Amendment cases address the Equal Protection Clause and the Due 
Process Clause. Cases involving the Due Process Clause have evolved alongside equal 
protection cases. The Court’s definition of “due process” has matured since Griswold v. 
Connecticut in 1965, a case which defined privacy as an important element of due 
process. Since Griswold, due process has grown to mean more than the negative liberty 
of privacy. The cases of Loving, Turner and Zablocki gradually developed an 
interpretation of due process which included positive liberties, like state recognition, for 
such rights as the right to marry.   
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Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 
 In addition to the equal protection of fundamental rights, the right to privacy has 
an important role to play in the case for same sex marriage. The right to privacy was first 
significantly clarified in Griswold v. Connecticut. Griswold involved a Connecticut 
statute that made use contraceptive use a criminal offense. The executive and medical 
directors of Planned Parenthood were charged for providing birth control to several 
Connecticut married couples. When faced with the decision as to whether or not the 
statute violated of the Constitution, the Court ruled in favor of the Planned Parenthood 
directors.  
 The constitutional question before the Court, according to the majority opinion 
written by Justice Douglas, was whether or not the use of birth control within a marriage 
was protected under the penumbra of rights referred to as the right to privacy. Douglas 
demonstrated using support from Society of Sisters and Meyer, that marriage is included 
in the right to privacy.  
 While Douglas and the dissenters, Justice Hugo Black and Justice Potter Stewart, 
considered the right to privacy at the heart of the constitutional question before the Court, 
Justice Arthur Goldberg’s concurrence focused on the Ninth Amendment. Goldberg 
described how “the language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the 
Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, 
protected from government infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights 
specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments.”47 Among these additional rights is 
the right to privacy, according to Goldberg.  
 
47 Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).  
38
 The influence of Goldberg’s concurrence extended beyond the right to privacy, 
however. He explained that “[the Ninth Amendment] was proffered to quiet expressed 
fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover 
all essential rights and that the mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial 
that others were protected.”48 Goldberg described how the Founders intended the Ninth 
Amendment to act as a reminder that not all essential rights are articulated in the 
Constitution. According to Goldberg, the “rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise 
a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically 
protected”49 and they are thus protected under the Ninth Amendment.  
 While this additional protection of the right to marry seems promising to the case 
for gay marriage, Justice Goldberg added several comments at the end of his concurrence 
which virtually negate such an application of his words. In reference to the state’s interest 
in discouraging questionable moral behavior in marriage, Goldberg wrote, “adultery, 
homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State forbids… but the 
intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the 
institution of marriage… it is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid 
extra-marital sexuality… or to say who may marry, but it is quite another… to regulate… 
the details of that intimacy.”50 
Even if Goldberg did not intend his discussion of the Ninth Amendment to apply 
to homosexual relationships, the Griswold opinion provides a turning point for cases 
involving the right to marry. The Court “linked the negative rights of individuals not to 
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be interfered with by the state to the existence of the institution of marriage.”51 Griswold 
effectively shifts the duty of the state from one of equal application of the laws to a duty 
to respect the privacy of marriage. This shift towards due process and away from equal 
protection continued after Griswold with the cases of Loving v. Virginia, Zablocki v. 
Redhail and Turner v. Safely.  
Loving v. Virginia (1967) 
 Loving v. Virginia involved a Virginia antimiscegenation statute which punished 
an interracial couple by banishing them from the state. The Lovings challenged the statue 
on the grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court ruled in favor of 
the Lovings. 
 The Loving majority opinion discussed equal application. “Loving, however, is 
also an important due process case because the Court for the first time addressed the 
significance of the marital relationship from the perspective of due process in the absence 
of considerations of privacy and the right to be left alone.”52 Unlike the claimants in 
Griswold, the Lovings did not request that the state of Virginia remove itself from the 
regulation of marriage. Quite the contrary, the issue in Loving was one of recognition. 
Because the state of Virginia did not recognize the marriage of some couples, the 
Lovings argued that their fundamental right to marry had been violated.  
Virginia argued that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
because both individuals of different races were punished with equal stringency. A 
similar argument could be made for anti-gay marriage statutes, that both homosexual and 
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heterosexual people are barred from marrying someone of the same gender. However, 
Justice Warren described that “the fact of equal application does not immunize the statute 
from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has 
traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race.”53 Therefore, if sexual 
orientation can be classified alongside race, the argument for equal application falls apart 
in much the same way it did in Loving.
The impact of Loving v. Virginia on the case for same sex marriage is three-fold. 
First, Loving demonstrates that equal application no longer justifies inequitable 
distribution of a fundamental right. Second, Loving adds an element of action to the state 
duties required by the Due Process Clause. “The liberty protected by the due process 
clause in the context of marriage goes beyond privacy concerns” and towards a focus on 
recognition by the state.54 The state is not only obligated to leave private relationships 
alone, but to recognize some of them as marital. Finally, Loving establishes that “the 
failure of the state to [recognize certain marriages] can constitute a violation of the 
fundamental right to marry.”55 Loving emphasizes the duty of the state to recognize 
marriage as an element of due process. Zablocki v. Redhail has a similar focus.  
 
Zablocki v. Redhail (1978) 
 Zablocki v. Redhail involved a statute which required certain Wisconsin residents 
to obtain a court order in order to marry within the state. Under the statute, individuals 
paying child support could not obtain a marriage license if they owed any of their 
support. Furthermore, these citizens needed to demonstrate their ability to continue 
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paying support regularly. Redhail was responsible for his illegitimate daughter and had 
not fulfilled his financial obligations to the child’s mother for several years. Because the 
statute denied him the right to marry, Redhail filed a complaint on behalf of himself and 
the entire class of Wisconsin residents who had been refused a marriage license. He 
challenged the statute on the grounds that it denied the right to marry guaranteed by the 
equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 The Court ruled in favor of Redhail. In his majority opinion, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall elaborated on the fundamental quality of the right to marry. Because a 
fundamental right was violated, Marshall indicated “‘critical examination of the state 
interest is required.”56 Since Skinner, the violation of a fundamental right had been 
granted strict scrutiny by the Court.  Marshall contributed further to this precedent in the 
Zablocki opinion. He described, “When a statutory classification significantly interferes 
with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by 
sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those 
interests.”57 
Marshall’s opinion makes clear that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the 
fundamental right to marry. This right is supported by the right to privacy and should be 
defended with strict scrutiny when threatened. These strong statements, however, leave 
one important question unanswered in terms of same sex marriage. If anti-gay marriage 
statutes are passed, do they “significantly interfere” with the fundamental right to marry 
sufficiently to impose strict scrutiny to the analysis? Considering the future direction of 
the Courts’ due process analysis, the answer could likely be “yes.”  
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 Whereas a “significant interference” was traditionally interpreted to mean the 
state standing between individuals and the rights granted to them by the Constitution, 
Loving marked a new interpretation by shifting the focus of due process from negative 
liberty to positive liberty. “The constitutional problem in Zablocki was not what the state 
did in terms of actions…but in terms of its omission, that is, its refusal to recognize the 
plaintiff’s relationship as marital.”58 The constitutional question was not one of 
interference, but one of omission. Still, the Court ruled that the state’s impact was 
“significant” and unconstitutional.  
 The Zablocki ruling strengthens the Loving ruling. If Loving were merely an equal 
protection case, the Zablocki ruling would not make sense. Zablocki indicates that “if we 
view the right to marry only in terms of negative liberty… we are unable to explain fully 
the kind of affirmative obligation of recognition that the state is under as a result of the 
Court’s ruling in Zablocki.”59 Even if the state does not interfere with the private issues 
of intimate relationships, Zablocki ruled that the state is limited in its ability to be 
indifferent toward at least some relationships. Whether or the state is obligated to 
recognize same sex relationships is debatable. The imposition of the Due Process Clause 
on the state to recognize at least some intimate relationships as marital is further 
established in the case of Turner v. Safley.
Turner v. Safely (1987) 
Turner v. Safley involved a Missouri statute which limited the marriages of 
inmates in Missouri prisons. The statute allowed only for marriages which had approval 
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by the warden of the prison. Most of the inmates whose marriages were approved had 
illegitimate children with their future spouse. The state argued that the statute was a 
necessary regulation to prevent “love triangles” and encourage the rehabilitation of 
female offenders.60 The Court questioned whether these objectives were rationally related 
to the infringement on the fundamental right to marry.  
The opinion by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor held that “the Missouri marriage 
regulation was facially infirm as infringing upon the fundamental constitutional right to 
marry, because the regulation was not reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.”61 In other words, the Missouri statute did not pass the test because the 
infringement of the right to marry was unjustified.    
Turner advances the precedent towards positive liberty considerations. The case 
sheds light on the question of same sex marriage because it “is the case that most clearly 
supports the proposition that the state has a due process obligation to recognize at least 
some relationships as marital.” Also, Turner raises a question of equal application and 
“whether the state, once it recognizes some relationships as marital, has an equality-based 
obligation to recognize others in that way.”62 No questions of equal protection arise in 
Turner, nor are there considerations of privacy. It only requires the state to recognize 
some relationships as marital.  
More so than any other case, Turner is concerned with recognition of 
relationships, not restrictions on the regulation of relationships. O’Connor notes that 
many important aspect of the marital relationship are unaffected by incarceration. 
“Inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support and public 
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commitment. These elements are an important and significant aspect of the marital 
relationship.”63 Turner solidifies the obligation of the state to play a role in these 
elements of marriage, if only because “civil marriage… cannot exist in the absence of 
state recognition.”64 
An analysis of Turner within the body of case law brings one to the question, 
“Are same sex relationships included under these liberties protected by the Court?” 
O’Connor’s comments on the importance of emotional support and public commitment to 
intimate relationships demonstrate a historical progression of the Court. At least several 
justices are beginning to see intimate relationships in terms of emotional bonds and 
commitment. Lawrence v. Texas demonstrates that this newly developing attitude 
considers same sex relationships.   
 
Lawrence v. Texas (1997) 
Lawrence involved the conviction of two men for “consensual sexual intimacy” 
under a Texas statute which made “deviant sexual intercourse” a crime.65 While Bowers 
v. Hardwick ruled that such statues were constitutional in 1986, the Court held that the 
statute violated the Due Process Clause and overruled Bowers in 2003 with Lawrence v. 
Texas. 
Lawrence involved a Texas statute that made sexual conduct between people of 
the same sex illegal. Two men, Lawrence and Garner, violated the statute. The Court held 
that “the statute… sought to control a personal relationship that was within the liberty of 
persons to choose without being punished as criminals,” and that “the statute furthered no 
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legitimate state interest which could justify the statute’s intrusion into the personal and 
private life of the individual.”66 The ruling emphasized the right to choose one’s private, 
sexual conduct in the privacy of the home, emphasizing the prior rulings on privacy in 
Society of Sisters, Meyer and Griswold.  
 The Lawrence opinion contributes to the emerging focus on due process, instead 
of equal protection, in cases involving the right to privacy and same sex conduct. In his 
opinion for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy describes how cases like Baird v. 
Eisenstadt and Roe v. Wade have demonstrated that the protection of sexual privacy 
found in Griswold is not limited to married adults.67 Kennedy emphasizes that the 
question at hand is not whether “the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right 
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy”68 but whether the right to privacy established by 
such cases as Griswold is violated when such behavior is criminalized.69 
While Kennedy applied an expansive and forceful interpretation of the Due 
Process Clause, Justice O’Connor argued that the case involved a question of equal 
protection in her concurrence. O’Connor saw the Texas statute as unconstitutional 
because it targeted homosexuals, as opposed to the statute in question in Bowers, which 
was universally intended.70 O’Connor agreed with Kennedy’s holding, but disagreed with 
his reasoning and argued that Bowers should not have been overturned.  
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Justice O’Connor applied strict scrutiny in her concurring opinion in Lawrence.
O’Connor’s concurrence exemplifies the use of strict scrutiny analysis in a case involving 
same sex relationships. The Equal Protection Clause is extensively discussed by Justice 
O’Connor not just in light of Bowers but with an eye to the future for same sex marriage. 
While the decision itself is based on due process, Lawrence v. Texas contains explicit 
language about the relationship between same sex marriage and the Equal Protection 
Clause. O’Connor describes the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause, hinting at an 
outlet for expanding the rights of homosexuals through the strict scrutiny standard of 
review. While it may seem fairly obvious that suspect classification is the most clear 
legal path to the legalization of same sex marriage, never before had that sentiment been 
expressed explicitly in the legal precedent of the Supreme Court. While O’Connor 
practically describes a point-by-point support of suspect classification of homosexuals, 
she stops short of endorsing same sex marriage. In fact, she notes that a prohibition on 
same sex marriage could be legitimized by the Court if a state put forth an effective 
reason. Despite these confusing “hints,” Lawrence is far more significant for its same sex 
marriage implications than for its fairly predictable response to Bowers.71 O’Connor’s 
concurrence is the most blatant support for suspect classification of homosexuals in legal 
history.    
 Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence is equally forceful in it’s dismissal of suspect 
classification of homosexuals. In his dissent in both Romer and Lawrence, Justice Scalia 
provided an argument regarding the three-tiered test for suspect classification and its lack 
of support for homosexuality as such a class. Scalia does not designate homosexuals as a 
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class because he believes that homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic but a 
lifestyle choice. Scalia argues that the gay rights movement demonstrates that gays have 
ample (if not disproportionate) access to political power. Failure on two of the three tiers 
of the test for suspect classification does not warrant the protection of homosexuals as a 
class, according to Scalia.  
While Kennedy and O’Connor disagree on the method of reasoning, their 
opinions distinguish between the criminalization of sexual conduct and the recognition of 
the relationship in which it takes place. Justice Scalia makes no such distinction in his 
dissent. Scalia argues that the Lawrence opinion “dismantles the structure of 
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and 
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”72 While 
Scalia exaggerates, he touches on an interesting point which is essential to this thesis. 
Scalia sees the right to privacy and negative liberty as fundamentally interconnected to 
the recognition of a relationship by the state. He argues that, after Lawrence eliminates 
the right of the state to interfere in sexual conduct, there is no justification for denying 
recognition of homosexual relationships. I wholly agree. While Scalia and I seek opposite 
conclusions, our methods are similar.     
 In Lawrence, the Court held that the Texas statute violated the right to privacy 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Kennedy stated that “the 
petitioners are entitled to their private lives…Their right to liberty under the Due Process 
Clause gives them full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the 
government.”73 The implications of this holding on the question of same sex marriage are 
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complicated. The Lawrence decision solidified homosexuals’ privacy protection by the 
Court. With privacy linked so closely to marriage in cases like Meyer, Skinner, Loving, 
and Griswold, I build on Scalia’s Lawrence dissent. I argue that case precedent 
articulates the fundamental right for a homosexual to marry- and for the private aspects of 
that marriage to be protected and the public recognition of it acknowledged by the state. 
The following chapter describes this argument.   
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Chapter Four  
In Support of Same Sex Marriage 
 
The existing case law regarding issues of marriage, privacy and same sex 
relationships demonstrates important aspects of the same sex marriage question. First, 
cases like Meyer, Skinner, and Pierce demonstrate the fundamental right to marry. 
Second, as Carlos Ball argues, there are both positive and negative liberties involved in 
this fundamental right. Third, the Due Process Clause has been used to protect the liberty 
of privacy for a long time, and the emerging protection of recognition is well established 
in case precedent. Finally, the Court articulated in Lawrence v. Texas that the right to 
privacy applies to intimate homosexual relationships. While these three points are crucial 
to the case for same sex marriage, more is needed to complete my argument. This chapter 
will expand on the argument that began in the previous section. I first describe the 
importance of the fundamental right to marry to my argument, and by demonstrate briefly 
that this right exists. Next, I address the due process considerations of the argument. This 
section includes a discussion of positive and negative liberties involved in exercising the 
right to marry, in terms of privacy and recognition. Finally, I discuss the contributions of 
equal protection to the argument and several problems which arise when one considers 
questions of equal application. What results is a demonstration that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, with support of case precedent, protects the right for same sex couples to 
marry.  
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Part One: Suspect Classification - A Dead End Road to Strict Scrutiny 
 The degree of protection provided by the Court varies depending on the groups 
and interests at stake. Strict scrutiny has traditionally been reserved solely for cases 
involving discrimination against a suspect class of people, discrimination based on race. 
A group qualifies as a suspect class if its defining characteristic is immutable, if there is a 
history of discrimination against the group, and if access to legislative means of 
representation is limited by discrimination. This three-tiered test is a difficult one to pass. 
While to date only racial and ethnic groups have received the protection of strict scrutiny, 
scholars like Albert and Feigen argue that sexual orientation is also a suspect 
classification.  
 If sexual orientation were determined to be a suspect classification, it would place 
a heavy burden of proof on the state to justify any discrimination against homosexuals, 
including restricting their access to marriage. While strict scrutiny is a clear “goal” for 
the case for same sex marriage, I do not believe that suspect classification is the best way 
to achieve that goal.  
 The ambiguous and particular qualities of homosexuality render suspect 
classification extremely problematic. First, it is difficult to say that sexual orientation is 
an immutable characteristic. In other words, some people may be gay or lesbian by 
choice and others because they feel it is a quality with which they were born. Whether or 
not anyone is born with their sexual orientation pre-determined is yet to be determined.74 
The possibility of a gay gene contributes more questions than answers to the issue of 
immutability at this time.  
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Furthermore, it is difficult to resolve even what constitutes homosexuality. Many 
believe homosexual behavior, or gay sex, is what defines a person as homosexual. This is 
exemplified in Justice Scalia’s Romer dissent. Others believe one’s sexual preferences are 
part of their identity, either expressed or not.75 The disparity between the acts and identity 
debate over homosexuality renders a conclusion about immutability virtually impossible.  
Still, sexual orientation could be considered a suspect classification if the other 
two tiers of the three tiered test can be demonstrated. The second, a history of 
discrimination, needs little explanation. While there are individuals, like the makers of 
the Report series of videos, who believe that homosexuals are not victims of 
discrimination, most do. The frequent occurrence of hate crimes against gays like 
Matthew Sheppard has made the case for a history of discrimination against gays and 
lesbians.  
While it is possible to demonstrate a history of discrimination, the final tier of the 
three tiered test is a difficult hurdle to jump. In order to demonstrate that gay, lesbian and 
bisexual people have limited access to legislative resources, it is necessary to argue 
against the efficacy of powerful political action organizations like the Human Rights 
Campaign and even homosexual political leaders like New Jersey’s former Governor 
James McGreevy. Justice Scalia commented in Romer, “Because those who engage in 
homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities, 
have high disposable incomes and, of course, care about homosexual rights issues much 
more ardently than the public at large, they possess political power greater than their 
numbers.”76 While Scalia’s comments are sweeping generalizations, it is true that there 
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are many means by which gay and lesbian causes can be promoted at the legislative level. 
While it could be argued that African Americans also have powerful legislative 
advocacy, the case for racial immutability is arguably much stronger than is the case for 
homosexual immutability. As a result, I cannot safely demonstrate that sexual orientation 
qualifies for suspect classification to the same degree as race, securing strict scrutiny 
analysis.  
 
Part Two: The Road Less Traveled – The Fundamental Right to Marry 
Luckily, since Skinner, another path to strict scrutiny exists.  The fundamental 
nature of the right to marry has been demonstrated in the cases of Meyer, Pierce and 
Skinner. Over time, the Court has asserted the difference between those rights that are 
fundamental and other rights. Until Skinner, the importance of this qualification of rights 
was ambiguous. In Skinner, Justice Douglas explained that the Court was “dealing… with 
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.”77 Because the right to 
marry was fundamental, the Court applied a high level of scrutiny to the legislation, strict 
scrutiny. Strict scrutiny placed a heavy burden of proof on the state to demonstrate that 
the legislation was directly related to a legitimate government interest.  
Following Skinner, the violation of fundamental rights was consistently granted 
strict scrutiny by the Court. “The Court has continuously held that marriage is a 
fundamental right that may be deprived only if the government has a compelling 
purpose.”78 Such a compelling purpose has never been demonstrated. Indeed, the Court 
has reaffirmed the precedent of Meyer, Pierce and Skinner in many Fourteenth 
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Amendment cases, including Loving, Zablocki and Turner. The fundamental right to 
marry is firmly rooted in case precedent.  
The precedent described in the previous chapter does more than validate the 
fundamental right to marry, however. Cases like Griswold, Loving and Turner 
demonstrate the nature of this right. The fundamental right to marry is composed of 
different liberties, both positive and negative.  
Part Three: The Liberties Involved in the Right to Marry 
The right to marry is unique because it involves both privacy and recognition. The 
right to marital privacy has accompanied the right to marry since Meyer. Skinner is the 
first significant case which hinged on the right to marital privacy. Following Skinner was 
Griswold, which also affirmed the right to marital privacy. These cases “which are 
primarily (and necessarily) focused on the negative obligations of the state, [depended], if 
only implicitly, on the prior positive steps taken by the state to recognize certain 
relationships as marital.”79 An attempt to separate the positive and negative liberties 
involved in the right to marry is therefore difficult. Privacy, in the cases of Skinner and 
Griswold, would be irrelevant if the state refused to recognize the relationship in which 
the private behavior took place. And so, in marital privacy cases, the negative liberty 
relies on the positive liberty. There is marital privacy because there is marriage, not the 
other way around.  
Marital privacy was extended to homosexual couples in Lawrence. Observing the 
connection between positive and negative liberties of marriage, therefore, an interesting 
argument arises. It is necessary to grant state recognition of same sex relationships 
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because the privacy practiced therein is dependent upon state recognition. In recognizing 
privacy rights, the state must grant recognition. While this argument may seem 
complicated and slightly illogical, there is a significant body of case law to support the 
idea that positive and negative liberties in the right to marry are interconnected.    
Beginning with the case of Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), the right to privacy has 
been extended beyond the marital bedroom.80 Cases like Eisenstadt and Lawrence 
demonstrate that the right to privacy in an intimate relationship extends beyond marriage 
into heterosexual and homosexual relationships, protecting the right to intimate conduct 
without being penalized. These cases use Meyer, Skinner and Griswold as support for the 
right to intimate privacy. Not until 2003 was that right extended to homosexual couples 
in Lawrence.
Lawrence was especially significant for its contributions to the connection 
between negative and positive liberty. Justice Kennedy “distinguished between the ability 
of the state, consistent with the Constitution, to criminalize same-gender sexual conduct, 
and the obligation of the state to recognize same-sex relationships.”81 In making such a 
distinction, Kennedy alludes to the two part liberty associated with marriage. However, 
Kennedy does not recognize the significant evidence which connects the positive and 
negative liberties involved in the right to marry. “Justice Kennedy was incorrect when he 
implied in his majority opinion in Lawrence that there is (always) an important 
distinction between state interference with intimate relationships on the one hand and 
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state recognition of those relationships on the other.”82 While Kennedy’s distinction may 
be correct for many private decision (like the decision to end a pregnancy), marriage 
stands as an important exception.  
While the privacy of intimate conduct and the recognition of the intimate 
relationship in which it takes place are different, these two liberties are linked in the case 
of marriage.  Kennedy’s opinion states that sodomy statutes “seek to control a personal 
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the 
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”83 Kennedy 
acknowledges that same sex relationships may be entitled to state recognition, as are 
marital relationships. By connecting the privacy of non-marital conduct to the recognition 
guaranteed to married, heterosexual relationships, the Lawrence majority directly 
confronts the question of same sex marriage. While he does not advocate for this 
recognition, the Lawrence opinion discusses liberty in a way that contributes to an 
argument for the state recognition of same sex relationships. 
 Lawrence v. Texas could have been decided with a more specific and less 
controversial opinion. The statute in question prohibited same sex intimate conduct, 
specifically targeting homosexuals. The Court had merely to acknowledge that the right 
to privacy extended beyond marital relationships and deem the statute unconstitutional. 
However, “the Court was unwilling to limit its understanding of the liberty interests at 
issue in the case to considerations of special privacy.”84 Kennedy’s opinion presents a 
conception of liberty that is composed of negative and positive elements. Kennedy 
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presets this expansive understanding of liberty when discussing the constitutionality of 
Bowers v. Hardwick.
The Bowers Court determined that the constitutional issue in question was 
“whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to 
engage in sodomy.”85 In response to this assertion, Kennedy describes the complexity of 
the real constitutional question: 
[The Bowers Court] discloses its own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at 
stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual 
conduct demeans the claim of the individual put forward, just as it would demean a 
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual 
intercourse86.
The liberty interests at stake in Lawrence, therefore, extended beyond the right to 
privacy and into the realm of respect and acceptance. Kennedy went beyond the 
necessary ruling to elaborate on the importance of respecting same sex relationships. 
Liberties like respect and acceptance cannot be placed in either the negative or positive 
camp. The willingness of the Court to recognize them, however, alerts us to several 
important points.  
First, the Court is moving away from a limited understanding of the nature of 
same sex relationships. Second, Lawrence serves as precedent promoting respect and 
acceptance of same sex relationships. This acceptance may extend beyond mere tolerance 
of the intimate conduct involved in such relationships. Finally, the Court has again 
contributed to the precedent which blurs the line between negative and positive liberties, 
adding same sex relationships to the discussion. These are important considerations in the 
case for same sex marriage, but there are still some unanswered questions.     
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 In this section, I have demonstrated the connectedness of the positive and 
negative liberties in the right to marry. I have explained that the recognition of marriages 
precedes and necessarily establishes the right to marital privacy. Since Lawrence, same 
sex relationships are entitled to the same privacy as marital relationships. Because of the 
dependence of marital privacy on acknowledgement by the state, privacy rights are not 
entirely separate from the right to state recognition. Lawrence connected homosexual 
couples to the right to marry by granting them the right to marital privacy.  
Is it necessary to recognize same sex relationships simply because they share the 
same negative liberties as married relationships? No. But it is unconstitutional to keep the 
right to recognition from same sex couples. The reasoning in this claim is two fold and 
involves the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
the following two sections, several questions are posed. First, “Are positive liberties 
protected by the Constitution in the case of marriage?” Next, “Do these positive liberties 
of the fundamental right to marry apply to same sex couples?” Finally, “Are there any 
compelling reasons not to recognize some homosexual relationships as marital?” I argue 
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the recognition of some same sex relationships 
as marital.  
 
Part Four: Due Process and the Protection of Liberty 
 The Constitution protects the recognition of marriages as a liberty under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The positive liberty of recognition has 
emerged alongside privacy rights in the body of case law surrounding same sex marriage. 
In Loving v. Virginia, the Court asserted that “Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of 
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man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom 
on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes… is 
surely to deprive all the States’ citizens of liberty without due process of law.”87 While 
the Loving opinion responded to racial classifications, not sexual orientation 
classifications, a parallel can be drawn between the Lovings and homosexual couples 
wishing to marry.  
In the Loving opinion, the Court acknowledged the role recognition plays in the 
fundamental right to marry. If recognition were not a part of the fundamental right to 
marry, the case for the Lovings would not have been as powerful. For the first time, with 
the Loving decision, the Court recognized the importance of the marital relationship 
beyond considerations of privacy. The Court concluded that “the denial of [recognition], 
that is, the failure of the state to act, violated the claimants’ fundamental right to 
marry.”88 Loving is, therefore, powerful precedent demonstrating that the fundamental 
right to marry is incomplete without state recognition.  
Zablocki strengthened this precedent. Similar to Loving, the Zablocki decision 
focused primarily on equal protection, not due process. However, the Court indicated that 
the state violated the rights of the petitioners in keeping the right to marry from them 
solely because of their financial status. This decision further confirms that the 
fundamental right to marry involves more than negative liberties. It involves an element 
of recognition. When that recognition is kept from citizens without legitimate reason, the 
state violates the right to marry. Zablocki expands the precedent set with Loving, granting 
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Court protection of the right to marry to non-minority groups. After Zablocki, one need 
not be a racial minority in order to command Court protection.    
Still, Zablocki and Loving were both equal protection cases and do not focus 
solely on the liberty interests involved in the right to marry. “It could be argued that 
whatever positive obligation on the state to recognize marriage that can be gleaned from 
[these cases] is primarily based on equal protection considerations rather than on 
substantive due process grounds.”89 However, the Turner decision was based entirely on 
due process grounds. The Equal Protection Clause had no role in the decision. 
Importantly, nor did the right to privacy. Because the inmates in Turner had little to no 
private lives and were not an established minority, the Court found reason to protect the 
right to marry exclusive of negative liberties and equal protection considerations. Justice 
O’Connor explained that the state was obligated to recognize the “important attributes of 
marriage [that] remain… after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life.” 
Among these important attributes are “expressions of emotional support and public 
commitment… spiritual significance,” all of which are elements of the fundamental right 
to marry.90 
The cases of Loving, Zablocki and Turner provide evidence with which to answer 
the first question required by my argument: Is the liberty of recognition protected by the 
Constitution? Yes, it is. Indeed, the right to marry exists beyond and exclusive from the 
right to sexual privacy and is protected by the Constitution in cases like Loving, Zablocki 
and Turner.
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Part Five: Equal Protection - Liberty and Justice for All 
 Given the right to recognition of one’s marriage exists, the case for same sex 
marriage develops. However, more questions remain. Does this protected liberty of 
recognition apply to same sex couples? In order to answer this question, I turn to the 
Equal Protection Clause.  
The Equal Protection Clause requires a level of scrutiny by the Court dependent 
upon the discrimination in question. Skinner established that the violation of a 
fundamental right warrants the strictest scrutiny on the part of the Court. Because 
marriage is a fundamental right and the positive liberty element of that right is violated 
when homosexuals are not granted state recognized marriage, discrimination against 
them requires strict scrutiny analysis.  
Such an analysis demands that the statute in question be substantially related and 
necessary for the accomplishment of a state objective, or a compelling state interest. It 
follows that the protected liberty of recognition in the right to marry must be granted to 
homosexual couples unless a compelling reason not to can be demonstrated by the state. 
According to Justice O’Connor, “Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations-the 
asserted state interest in [Lawrence] - other reasons exist to promote the institution of 
marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.”91 
What, then, constitutes a compelling reason to violate a fundamental right? What 
legitimate reasons might there be to grant equal protection of positive liberty to 
homosexual couples? A frequently argued reason to keep marriage from same sex 
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couples is that marriage, by definition, is reserved for heterosexual unions only.92 This 
claim addresses two important elements of those arguments against same sex marriage. 
First, this claim inspires the perception of an articulated definition of marriage and 
second, the belief that marriage is founded in a historical tradition greater and more 
powerful that the principles of law upon which the United States was founded.  
The idea that marriage is defined as a union between one man and one woman is 
unsupported by legislative history. Congress has recognized the flexibility of the term 
when “during the codification of the ban on gays in the military, it included a provision 
excluding people in homosexual marriages.”93 The perceived necessity of this provision 
demonstrates that there is ambiguity about the definition of marriage. Furthermore, 
fifteen states have amended their constitutions to clarify the definition of marriage as a 
heterosexual union, revealing the absence of a foundational definition of “marriage.” 
If semantics may not be a compelling reason to violate the fundamental right to 
marry, so many argue that a historical tradition of heterosexual marriage acts as reason 
enough to limit this right. Many critics of same sex marriage fail to recognize that 
“marriage is an evolving institution, and like many institutions, generational changes 
result in new interpretations.”94 Among these new interpretations include the recognition 
that wives are not property, that individuals of different races are capable of loving one 
another, and that marital relationships constitute much more than an opportunity to 
reproduce.  
 
92 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case for Same Sex Marriage: From Sexual Liberty to Civilized 
Commitment, (The Free Press 1996): 128.  
93 Polk, 8.  
94 Polk, 9.  
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The inability to recognize the fluid notion of marriage leads to the claim that 
marriage is the foundation of the human race, that procreation is the primary goal of 
marital unions, and that homosexual relationships have no way of achieving this goal.95 If 
these were compelling reasons to keep the right to marry from homosexuals, it must be 
kept from the impotent, sterile and aged members of our society as well.96 Clearly, 
procreation is not a compelling reason to outlaw same sex marriage.  
Definitions, history and procreation are not legitimate reasons to limit the 
fundamental right to marry. Thus, moral disapproval and fear constitute the remaining 
argument. The Court established in Lawrence that “moral disapproval [is not] a 
legitimate state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not 
heterosexual sodomy.”97 The Court, therefore, should not recognize disapproval as a 
legitimate reason to limit the fundamental right to marry. Without the criminalization of 
homosexual conduct upon which to fall back, opponents of same sex marriage, Justice 
Scalia comments on the lack of any legitimate reason to limit the right to marry only to 
heterosexuals. He states, 
 [Lawrence] dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a 
distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal 
recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexuals is ‘no 
legitimate state interest’… what justification could there possibly be for denying the 
benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising ‘the liberty protected by the 
Constitution?98 
95 The Report, The Gay Agenda. 
96 Polk, 9.  
97 Lawrence, 582.  
98 Lawrence, 604-605. 
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No compelling reasons exist to keep the recognition of marital relationships from 
homosexual couples. The promotion of a definition which does not exist is not a 
sufficient reason to limit fundamental rights. A bare desire to harm homosexuals or the 
adherence to a history remembered incorrectly do not constitute are inadequate 
arguments. Finally, moral disapproval does not suffice to legitimize discrimination of any 
kind. The state, therefore, must recognize same sex relationships as marital.  
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has made a case for same sex marriage. My argument depends upon 
the development of case precedent which demonstrates a fundamental right to marriage, 
the emergence of positive and negative liberties associated with that right, and the 
inclusion of homosexuals under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
fundamental right to marry has been violated. Fundamental rights are granted strict 
scrutiny protection under the law and so, the right to marry requires strict scrutiny 
protection by the Court. Following such an analysis, it is clear that there are no legitimate 
reasons to keep state recognition of marriages from homosexual unions. The Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution does indeed protect the right of same sex couples to 
marry.  
 This argument takes a place within a great body of scholarship devoted to the 
topic of same sex marriage. While many have argued in support, I have found that most 
of these arguments focus on either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection 
Clause, rarely both. My argument is unique because it presents a comprehensive 
approach to the Fourteenth Amendment. I believe that mine is the clearest, safest path 
towards legalizing same sex marriage. My argument brings advocates of same sex 
marriage one step further towards achieving their full right to marriage.  
 While my argument is unique, the line of reasoning I have presented is not the 
only method of argument available. Suspect classification and undue burden are other 
approaches to the Fourteenth Amendment that could arguably defend same sex marriage. 
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My objections to the use of suspect classification, primarily the unreliability of the 
immutability standard, have been outlined in the thesis. A brief analysis of the undue 
burden test is necessary.  
 The undue burden test, like the strict scrutiny standard, aids the Court in deciding 
whether or not a right has been violated. The standard was first presented in a joint 
opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.99 
Casey challenged the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania abortion statute which placed 
several restrictions on abortions in the state. The Court was asked to rule on five of these 
provisions. Among them was the requirement of married women to inform their husbands 
of their choice to abort. In a joint opinion written by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and 
Souter, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of several of the provisions but 
determined that “the provision requiring spousal notice violated the due process clause by 
imposing an undue burden on a woman's abortion rights.”100 
In effect, the “undue burden” standard allowed the Court to carefully dissect the 
statute based on questions beyond concepts like fundamental rights. Much of the opinion 
focused on the nature of choice, a woman’s liberty in terms of abortion. The result was 
the simultaneous affirmation of Roe v. Wade, rejection of certain anti-abortion provisions, 
and the limiting of other reproductive freedom. The nuance of this standard renders it 
much more flexible than other standards of constitutional review, namely that of strict 
scrutiny. This flexibility presents the undue burden test as an interesting and promising 
path for the legalization of same sex marriage. My choice to focus on the strict scrutiny 
standard of review, therefore, requires a defense.    
 
99 Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Robert P. Casey, 505 U.S. 833; 112 S. Ct. 2791, 1992.  
100 Casey, 833.  
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 By comparing the undue burden and strict scrutiny standards, their relative 
advantages become clear. It has been said that, where the undue burden test acts as a 
scalpel, strict scrutiny is a sledgehammer.101 The former allows for precision and restraint 
and the latter demands sweeping application. It follows that any court with an interest in 
judicial restraint would prefer to apply the standard of undue burden to test the 
constitutionality of a statute. However, I believe any counsel with an interest in securing 
the most powerful decision to their client’s favor would surely request strict scrutiny 
review of their case. In constructing this thesis, I wore the hat of counsel, not jurist. I 
chose to argue for strict scrutiny over undue burden because of the power of the 
precedent it sets.  
 Abortion cases, currently in the spotlight for the undue burden test, demonstrate 
the failures of the standard. The Court, in Casey, pointed out that their decision marked 
the sixth time in a decade that Roe had been challenged. Because of the controversial 
nature of the abortion question, endless attacks on Roe v. Wade have been presented to 
the Court. Many have succeeded. Since Roe, the right to choose has been dissected into 
state-by-state statutes. Today, it is illegal for a rape victim to seek an abortion in South 
Dakota and women in Minnesota are required to read several pamphlets about the lives of 
the unborn before the procedure. When such statutes are continuously created and 
challenged, the Court becomes the battlefield for a never-ending political and social 
controversy. I believe that, were the undue burden test applied to anti-same sex marriage 
statutes, a similar situation would result.  
 Despite the current chaos that is abortion legislation, however, it is the foundation 
of a powerful and sweeping Court decision which has kept the right to abortion fairly safe 
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for over thirty years. While Roe has been challenged repeatedly, it has been upheld 
consistently. Without the powerful precedent set by Roe, I argue that the situation for 
abortion rights would be worse than it is today. The same is true for the same sex 
marriage question. As an advocate for same sex marriage, I find that the undue burden 
test is acceptable only when it is preceded by a stronger standard. Because legal same sex 
marriage would attract challenges and attacks, a strong standard must be set in order to 
limit political manipulation of the Court. 
 The right to same sex marriage will continue to be violated and attacked. Some 
are convinced that the prospect of legalized same sex marriage will remain a figment in 
the imaginations of civil rights advocates and legal scholars like me for years to come. 
Without a commitment to the letter of the law on the parts of the justices of the United 
States Supreme Court, it may be that there is little hope for the future of same sex 
marriage. Such objectivity becomes increasingly difficult in the today’s political 
atmosphere.  
 I remain, however, an optimist. There are many avenues of legal reasoning which 
end at same sex marriage. Mine is merely one such argument. I intend it to stand strong 
in the face of imposing challenge. While the future of liberal politics is arguably grim, 
and the insufficient justifications for limiting fundamental rights remain popular rhetoric, 
I will forever be a lover of the Constitution and its promise of equality and justice for all.      
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